Chapter 15

Poland in Europe and the world

Twenty years in the Union mean a net balance of EUR 162 bn and motorways that did not exist for half a century. Today Poland spends the most in NATO on defence relative to GDP, hosts the second-largest group of refugees from Ukraine, and for the first time in history produces less than half of its electricity from coal.

EU membership is the best-documented civilisational leap in Poland's post-war history — visible in incomes (chapter 4) but also in hard infrastructure: the motorway and expressway network grew from 434 km in 2000 to 5,593 km in 2026. The second pillar of Poland's position is security: in three years the country became the Alliance's largest relative defence spender. The third is the energy transition, which has accelerated even though it started from the EU's heaviest dependence on coal.

Fig. 15.1

From laggard to NATO leader: defence spending as % of GDP

Poland's defence expenditure, % of GDP, NATO methodology, 2014–2025

From laggard to NATO leader: defence spending as % of GDPafter 24 February 20220%1%2%3%4%5%NATO threshold: 2% of GDP2014201520162017201820192020202120222023202420251.86%2.21%1.99%1.88%2.00%1.96%2.21%2.19%2.21%3.27%3.79%4.48%
  • 1.86% of GDP (2014) → 4.48% (2025, NATO methodology) — the highest in the Alliance; Lithuania 4.0%, Latvia 3.7%, Estonia 3.4%
  • About USD 44.3 bn (2025) — the 6th-largest defence budget in NATO; 54.4% on equipment (2nd after Greece); USD 948 per inhabitant
  • The government reports 4.7% of GDP for 2025 (different scope, incl. the Armed Forces Support Fund); 2026 draft budget: about 4.8%

From the Alliance's laggard to first place in three years. Until 2022 Poland hovered around the 2% threshold; after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine spending more than doubled. Over half the budget goes on equipment — a sign of real modernisation, not mere upkeep.

A methodological note: NATO reports 4.48% for 2025, the Polish government 4.7% — both are true, differing in scope (the Armed Forces Support Fund and the timing of booking). In the peace ranking (chapter 12) this militarisation is the one component that costs Poland points.

Fig. 15.2

An army that doubled: the strength of the Polish Armed Forces

Strength of Poland's armed forces, thousand soldiers, NATO data, 2014–2025

An army that doubled: the strength of the Polish Armed Forces0 k50 k100 k150 k200 k250 k300 k99.0 k98.9 k101.6 k105.3 k109.5 k113.1 k116.2 k166.8 k176.0 k206.5 k216.1 k233.8 k201420152016201720182019202020212022202320242025
  • 99,000 soldiers (2014) → 233,800 (2025), +136%; the jump since 2021 — Territorial Defence Forces and the post-2022 build-up
  • Defence spending per inhabitant: USD 257 (2014) → USD 948 (2025)

Poland's army more than doubled its personnel in a decade — a change of scale, not a correction. Headcount and capital intensity are growing together: spending per inhabitant rose almost fourfold. Poland is today the second EU country after Germany in hosting refugees from Ukraine and the key logistics hub for aid to Kyiv.

Fig. 15.3

Twenty years in the Union: a net balance of EUR 161.8 bn

Financial flows Poland–EU, 2004–2023, EUR bn (current prices)

Twenty years in the Union: a net balance of EUR 161.8 bn0 EUR bn50 EUR bn100 EUR bn150 EUR bn200 EUR bn250 EUR bn300 EUR bn245.5 EUR bn83.7 EUR bn161.8 EUR bn161.0 EUR bn76.0 EUR bn29.5 EUR bnTotal receiptsContributionsNet balanceof which cohesionpolicyof which agriculture(CAP)of whichNextGenerationEU
  • 2004–2023: receipts EUR 245.5 bn, contributions EUR 83.7 bn, net balance EUR 161.8 bn — about EUR 12 bn a year on average (2–3.5% of GDP)
  • Two-thirds for cohesion policy (161 bn), just under a third for agriculture (76 bn); NextGenerationEU grants: 29.5 bn

Two-thirds of the transfers went into cohesion policy — hence the visible effect on roads, rail, sewage plants and municipal infrastructure. For two decades Poland was the EU budget's largest net beneficiary in absolute terms; from 2027, as income passes 90% of the average in successive regions, the stream will start to shrink.

The balance is only part of the account: access to the single market explains most of the sixfold rise in exports (chapter 5) — a benefit absent from this table.

Fig. 15.4

Below 50% for the first time: coal in Polish power generation

Coal's share of electricity generation, %, 2025, Poland against the EU

Below 50% for the first time: coal in Polish power generationPoland52.2%Czechia33.0%Bulgaria22.5%Germany22.4%EU279.2%
  • Coal's share of electricity: 79.7% (2016) → 55.2% (2024) → 52.2% (2025); below 50% for six months of 2025, and in June renewables produced more than coal
  • Renewables 2025: 31.4% (a record 54.7 TWh); gas 14.1%; solar PV 25.9 GW of capacity; in 2025 1.4 TWh of renewable energy was curtailed by grid constraints
  • The first nuclear plant (Lubiatowo-Kopalino, 3 × AP1000): construction from 2028, the first unit planned for 2036

The energy transition has accelerated, but it started from the heaviest coal dependence in the Union. In 2025 coal's share fell to 52% — 27 points below a decade earlier — and renewables delivered a record 31% of power. Poland and Germany together still account for over 70% of all coal-fired electricity in the EU.

The grid is not keeping up with the sources: in 2025 1.4 TWh of renewable energy was curtailed because of transmission constraints — twice as much as a year earlier. The nuclear plant is to deliver its first power in 2036; the schedule has already slipped several times, so it is a plan, not a fact.

Fig. 15.5

1.6 million home power plants: prosumers

Number of renewable micro-installations in Poland, millions, year-end, 2022–2025

1.6 million home power plants: prosumers0 m0.5 m1 m1.5 m2 m1.22 m1.42 m1.54 m1.64 m2022202320242025
  • 1,636,673 renewable micro-installations, 13.9 GW of capacity, 8.95 TWh of energy (end-2025) — about 5% of national generation; 99.9% are solar PV
  • Growth is slowing after the billing rules changed: +16.1% (2023) → +8.9% (2024) → +6.0% (2025); growth is shifting to large farms

One graphic shows success and braking at once: more than 1.6 million households and firms produce their own power — one of the fastest prosumer booms in Europe — but after the billing system changed, growth fell from the teens to six per cent a year. For the first time in six years the main engine of solar growth is large farms, not rooftops — the market is maturing.

Fig. 15.6

Roads that did not exist: 434 km in 2000, 5,593 km in 2026

Length of the motorway and expressway network in Poland, km

Roads that did not exist: 434 km in 2000, 5,593 km in 20260 km2,000 km4,000 km6,000 km8,000 km434 km1,484 km4,257 km5,593 km2000201020202026
  • Motorways and expressways: 434 km (2000) → about 1,484 (2010) → about 4,257 (2020) → 5,593 km (August 2026: 1,950 km of motorways + 3,643 km of expressways); 1,192 km under construction
  • PKP Intercity: a record 89.2 m passengers in 2025 (+14% y/y), about 244,000 a day; Baltic Hub: 2.77 m TEU (+23%)

Between 1970 and 2000 Poland built 434 km of motorways and expressways; in the decade 2011–2020 alone — 2,773 km. Today the network runs to 5,600 km, about two-thirds of the planned target shape, with another 1,200 km under construction. This is the money from the previous chart turned into concrete.

Rail is catching up: PKP Intercity carried a record 89 million passengers in 2025, a third more than two years earlier, and ordered Poland's first high-speed trains. Gdańsk's Baltic Hub — the only deep-water terminal on the Baltic — handled a record 2.77 million containers after its T3 terminal opened.

Fig. 15.7

A second home for a million: temporary protection for Ukrainians in the EU

People under temporary protection from Ukraine, end of June 2026, thousands, EU countries

A second home for a million: temporary protection for Ukrainians in the EUGermany1,286 kPoland961 kCzechia391 kSpain265 kRomania213 kSlovakia146 kNetherlands140 kIreland119 kBelgium94 k
  • June 2026: Germany 1,286,230, Poland 961,170 (21.8% of all in the EU), Czechia 390,810; EU total about 4.41 m
  • About 1.9 m people registered in the PESEL-UKR register in total, but far fewer actually live in Poland — the number is slowly falling

Four years after the war began, Poland still hosts almost a million people under temporary protection — one in five Ukrainian refugees in the Union — and is second after Germany in absolute numbers and first relative to population among the large states. This is the same group towards which Poles' attitudes have clearly cooled (chapter 13): the numbers on hospitality and the numbers on antipathy have to be read together.

Fig. 15.8

Where Poland sits on the world map: positions in global rankings

Poland's position in selected global rankings, 2025–2026 (lower = better; number of countries in brackets)

Where Poland sits on the world map: positions in global rankingsHenley Passport Index 2026 (199)6Media Literacy Index 2026 (41)20Economy, nominal GDP (IMF 2026)21Global Peace Index 2026 (163)22World Happiness Report 2026 (147)24RSF World Press Freedom Index 2026 (180)27Global Soft Power Index 2026 (193)31WJP Rule of Law Index 2025 (143)32EIU Democracy Index 2025 (167)34Human Development Index 2023 (193)35Global Innovation Index 2025 (139)39Corruption Perceptions Index 2025 (182)52
  • Passport: 6th (Henley, 183 visa-free destinations); peace: 22nd/163; happiness: 24th/147; rule of law: 32nd/143; HDI: 35th/193 (0.906, “very high”)
  • Innovation: 39th/139 (GII); democracy: 34th/167 (EIU 7.65, “flawed democracy”); corruption: 52nd/182 (CPI 53); soft power: 31st/193; economy: 21st (nominal GDP, IMF 2026)

One ranking strip shows the country's whole profile: in safety, happiness, passport strength and human development Poland is in the world's top tier (places 6–35 of 140–200 countries); in innovation, quality of democracy and perceived corruption — in the second or third ten. Its economic position (21st) is higher than its brand position (31st) — the gap this document tries to close.